In this paper, we present the experimental results of our investigation of network formation and the distribution of actions in a population of players whose members may select their partners in a bilateral 2x2 Hawk-Dove base game. In the population game, exploitive Hawk behavior leads to inefficiency while cooperative Dove behavior leads to efficient outcomes. The experiment was conducted in continuous time such that participants could change their base game action and their partners at any point in time. For this type of strategic interaction we introduce a strategy adaptation rule (anticipatory better-reply rule, ABR) for players with limited foresight and a related stability criterion (reaction-anticipating stable, RAS), both of which assume that players take other players' linking reactions into account when deciding on their strategies. A comparison of the ABR vs. the better-reply rule and the RAS vs. the Nash equilibrium ultimately reveals that the ABR and RAS are in better accord with our data. Moreover, we find that cooperative Dove behavior yielded higher payoffs than hawkish behavior.
Introduction
What guides people in building a social network in a competitive environment? To find out, we conducted an experiment in which subjects choose an action as well as their interaction partners in a 2×2 base game. Our Hawk-Dove (HD) base game can be considered competitive because both equilibria in pure strategies are associated with asymmetric Pareto-optimal payoffs whereas the cooperative symmetric Pareto-optimum of two Doves is not an equilibrium. However, even though there is no discrepancy between exploitive Hawk behavior and efficiency in our base game, this does not hold for the population game, which involves endogenous partner choices and linking costs.
Here, the level of efficiency (maximum sum of payoffs) increases with the number of cooperative Doves such that an efficient outcome allows for a maximum of only one Hawk. Will groups of players choosing the cooperative Dove strategy evolve? Or will groups bilaterally playing an asymmetric equilibrium in the base game survive? Before delving more deeply into these questions, we briefly explain the rationale of using a HD game as our base game.
The HD game is a form of the chicken game, and like the prisoner's dilemma game (PD), it represents social dilemma situations. The leading theme in PD is the frustration of the mutual desire to cooperate. The chicken game, however, represents a "contest in which each party is trying to prevail over the other" (Snyder, 1971) . In PD, players must instill mutual trust in order to reach a cooperative Pareto-optimal outcome, whereas in the chicken game, players strive to instill fear in their opponents to achieve the preferred equilibrium outcome (Rapoport, 1964) .
The chicken game can be used to describe various political crisis confrontations. For instance, it is an appropriate model to describe bilateral coercion or bilateral bargaining under the threat of violence (e.g., Lipman, 1986; Snyder, 1971) . Basic problems in international trade can also be modeled as a chicken game in which both players choose to offer their product either in their home country or abroad (see Colombo et al., 2005) . In this case, one of the key results is that firms can interact strategically to effect unilateral trade between two countries even in a perfectly symmetric environment. Furthermore, in contrast to the conventional wisdom of traditional international trade theory, the firms will not necessarily engage in two-way trade even if all trade barriers are removed.
The HD game is the basic paradigm in evolutionary game theory (see Maynard Smith, 1982, for details) . In one common example, a resource is to be divided between two agents who may act cooperatively or aggressively. If both behave cooperatively, the resource is shared equally; if their behavior differs, the aggressive agent receives the larger share of the divided resource; and if both agents act aggressively, then they each receive half of a lower-valued resource. In this sense, the game represents a situation of bilateral bargaining. Cornell and Roll (1981) employ a biological conflict model in an asset market context to investigate why traders should invest in different (basic or extended) levels of market analysis. Modeling the interaction as an HD game, they calculate the payoffs that can be reached by two interacting analysts. Under particular assumptions on the underlying parameters the mixed equilibrium strategy in this game is evolutionarily stable, i.e. a population of players who play according to this equilibrium will be immune against invading analysts.
These examples illustrate the relevance of the anti-coordination paradigm. In our paper, the HD game is extended in that players do not interact with a given fixed partner or with random partners in a population, but can activate links to other players in the population and play the game with each of her linked players. Two players play the game with each other if they are either unilaterally or bilaterally linked to each other.
Players in HD games in populations are usually assumed to play against a randomly selected member of the population. Before the interaction, players do not know whether the opponent is aggressive or cooperative. In our game, however, a player can observe her opponent's actions and then decide whether or not to initiate contact. Each interaction that is initialized by another player is profitable in our model; we therefore assume that no player may refuse to interact.
In keeping with the previous examples, let us now consider a bargaining situation in which a player may decide not to initiate contact with an opponent who appears to be too strong. This decision pertains to reputation: A party who wants to be perceived as cooperative might not want to interact with aggressive opponents. Concerning to negotiations within organizations, Tinsley et al. (2002) argue: " [...] presuming that organizations consist of people who are linked together in networks raises questions about how these networks affect negotiation behavior and outcomes. We argue that negotiators develop reputations that others can learn about and act on in subsequent negotiations." In our framework, different negotiation behaviors and reputations are modeled by the two different types of observable actions, Hawk and Dove. Bramoullé et al. (2004) and Berninghaus and Vogt (2006) have provided a theoretical analysis of HD games in endogenous networks. Related models of coordination games with different 2×2 base games can be found in Jackson and Watts (2002) , Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) , and Hojman and Szeidl (2006) ; Ule (2005) has provided a model of the PD. The HD game has been experimentally examined by Neugebauer et al. (2008) , whereby the majority of participants are found to act selfishly rather than cooperatively.
Our experiment investigates the co-evolution of networks and action choices in a base game. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first to investigate interaction in the HD game. We therefore hope that our research will contribute to the existing experimental literature on pairwise interaction with endogenous network formation. Kosfeld (2004) gives an overview of experiments on coordination games with different fixed interaction structures and experiments on network formation and the related theory.
Our research is most closely related to the work of Corbae and Duffy (2008) and Corten and Buskens (2008) , who investigate coordination games and network formation, as well as to that of Riedl and Ule (2002) , who study network formation and action choice in a PD game. There are numerous differences, however: in addition to utilizing different base games, link-cost structures, link-building processes, and other components in their experimental design, these authors also conducted their experiments in discrete time,
i.e. in rounds, whereas we chose to conduct ours in continuous time.
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In our experiment, subjects were freely permitted to change any component of their static strategy at any time; they were not constrained in any way. In particular, they have control over how long a particular strategy constellation influenced their payoff.
If they were unsatisfied with their current constellation, they are allowed to change it immediately and thus reduce the relevance (i.e. relative weight) of unfavorable payoffs with respect to the overall accumulated payoff. In contrast, in experiments conducted in discrete time, every payoff-relevant constellation is weighted equally. Another unique feature of our experiment is that players are allowed to make their decisions sequentially and are thus aware of the strategy constellations that came directly before and after their changes (even though the time period in which the constellation after a change prevailed might be small). When participants make decisions in discrete rounds, many of them may change action and links simultaneously, which is likely to lead to frequent coordination failures; our design in continuous time allows us to avoid these failures.
In our experiment, we investigate whether cooperative Dove behavior or competitive Hawk behavior prevails and which type of behavior is more profitable. We also test the predictive power of two alternative behavior rules, better-reply rule and anticipatory better-reply rule. The latter rule is presented and formalized in the theory section and is based on the assumption of players with limited foresight who take the subsequent 1 In the experiment of Riedl and Ule (2002) , subjects simultaneously choose links and actions in each of 60 rounds. Corbae and Duffy (2008) set up a two-stage game consisting of a network-determining stage and a five-period segment in which actions were chosen. In Corten and Buskens (2008) , 15 rounds of a coordination base game are played, each consisting of three stages in which players are allowed to: change their links, accept/reject links unilaterally proposed by others, and choose their actions in the base game.
linking reactions of other players into account when deciding on their own strategy changes. This rule is in accord with a certain stability criterion, reaction-anticipating stability, in that no player deviates according to the anticipatory better-reply rule if a reaction-anticipating stable state is reached. The same relation exists between the better-reply rule and the Nash equilibrium, which we also compare in the data analysis.
In the next section we describe the theoretical model. Before we discuss behavioral hypotheses and stability criteria in Section 4, we present the design of our experiment in Section 3. In Section 5, we analyze the experimental results with respect to our theoretical hypotheses and Section 6 concludes.
The Strategic-Networking Game
Consider a population of players who create their interaction structure via costly links and who choose an action in a 2 × 2 normal form game played with each of their interaction partners. In the following, we describe the 2×2 game and the game of choosing interaction partners separately. Then we combine both approaches and formulate the strategic-networking game.
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Let I = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of n agents who are engaged in playing the same 2 × 2 HD game with each of their neighbors in the network of players (which describes the interaction structure). To avoid trivialities, we assume n ≥ 3. If two players i and j are linked, they play the symmetric 2 × 2 normal form game Γ = {{i, j}, Σ, π(·)} with strategy set Σ := {H, D} and payoff function π(·): Σ × Σ → R characterized by the payoff table in Table 1 with a > b > c > d. The number of players choosing H and D are denoted by n H and n D , respectively, with n H + n D = n.
The game in Table 1 is a generalized HD game (or chicken game) derived from the traditional HD game of Maynard Smith (1982) . The Hawk strategy is abbreviated as Thus, a player who chooses D is better off when matched with another D rather than with an H, although playing D against D is not an equilibrium of game Γ.
We do not impose a fixed interaction structure but assume that networks are determined by individual decisions. A strategy of player i in the network game in normal form is a vector of ones and zeros, g i ∈ {0, 1} n . If g ij = 1, player i activates a link to player j, otherwise g ij = 0. A link between i and j allows both players to play the HD game Γ. A player cannot play the game with herself (g ii = 0 for all i). Note that two players play the game if at least one of them has a link to the other. 3 A single link is said to exist if two players are connected by one (unilateral) link and a double link means that they are connected by two links, i.e. bilaterally. Clearly, in the latter case, one link is redundant.
Each strategy configuration g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) in the network game generates a directed graph, denoted by G g , whose vertices represent players and a directed edge between i and j (i.e. g ij = 1) indicates that i has a link to j. The set of i's neighbors in a network G g is denoted by N i (G g ) and defined as the set of all players to whom i has a link (i.e. g ij = 1) and the set of all players who have a link to i (i.e. g ji = 1):
The set of i's neighbors to whom i has a link depends solely on i's network strategy vector g i and is defined as N a i (g i ) := {j | g ij = 1}. Activating a link to another player is costly for the initiator. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that costs k > 0 per link are constant and identical for all players.
Combining the two components, the strategic situation of a player is modeled as a non-cooperative game in normal form in which an individual decision is composed of the choice of neighbors via links g i ∈ {0, 1} n in the network game and actions σ i ∈ {H, D} in the HD game. This strategic-networking game is denoted by G = (I; S 1 , . . . , S n ; P 1 (·), . . . , P n (·)) with strategy set S i := {H, D} × {0, 1} n and payoff
induces a vector of each player's action in the HD games and a network represented by a directed graph G g . Player i's payoff function is
The value of the indicator function 1 {σ j =x} equals one if σ j = x, x ∈ {H, D}, and zero, otherwise; s −i is the vector of strategies s j ∈ S j of players j ∈ I\{i}; |N a i (g i )| denotes the cardinality of N a i (g i ). A player's total payoff is determined by her action in the HD game and the actions of the players with whom she is linked minus her total link costs. According to our payoff definition, player i may benefit from being linked to j even though she does not activate the link (if g ij = 0 but g ji = 1). In what follows, the term "strategy" refers to a strategy in the strategic-networking game G.
Experimental Design
In our experiment, the parameters of the HD game in Table 1 are chosen as a = 80, b = 60, c = 40, and d = 20. This game is embedded in a strategic-networking game with n = 6 agents, as described in Section 2. Costs k per link are our treatment variable:
we consider three treatments differing with respect to link costs k = 30, k = 50, and k = 70. The corresponding treatments are denoted by HD30, HD50, and HD70 (Table   3 ). These particular values of k influence the profitability of links depending on action choices. In each treatment, we run six groups each with six players. The strategic-networking game is repeated in continuous time. Each game lasts exactly 30 minutes and starts after all subjects have made their first decision, i.e. after each subject has decided which links to build and has chosen an action in the HD game.
Thereafter, subjects can change single components of their strategies -activate or delete a link or change their action -at any time. Information is updated 10 times per second.
The current payoff flow is computed every tenth of a second and the accumulated payoff is "integrated" up to the given moment. The information presented on every subject's screen throughout the game includes the elapsed time, her current payoff flow, and her current accumulated payoff. A subject's own and the other subjects' links and actions H or D 4 are illustrated graphically on the screen by directed arrows in a graph and and the chosen actions are indicated at the vertices of the graph. The players with whom one is linked are shown in a different color from the remaining players. to different expected payoffs in the treatments, we vary the conversion rate.
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The experiment was conducted at the University of Karlsruhe as a computerized laboratory experiment. It was organized into nine sessions with two groups each. Before the experiment started, subjects had to solve a few selected problems to ensure that they understood the rules of the game. The average, minimum, and maximum payoffs earned were e 14.16, e 8.85, and e 22.27, respectively.
Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses
First, as a natural benchmark for our (continuously) repeated strategic-networking game, we consider the Nash equilibria (NE) of the base game G.
In a NE, no player has an incentive to change her links g * i , her action σ * i ∈ {H, D}, or both unilaterally. The NE for the strategic-networking game G are described in Bramoullé et al. (2004) and Berninghaus and Vogt (2006) (see Table 12 ). The NE of our particular game G (with the HD game of Table 2 ) are shown in Table 14 . In the analysis of the experimental data, we test the empirical relevance of the NE of the base game G as an appropriate benchmark for our experiment on an aggregated group level and on an individual level. The former is tested by investigating whether the observed constellations are in accord with NE of G, while the latter is tested by examining the subjects' decisions with respect to the better-reply behavior rule.
Definition 2 (Better-Reply Rule (BR)). A player who deviates from her current strategy s i = (σ i , g i ) changes to a strategy which increases her payoff provided that the other players keep their strategies.
BR corresponds to NE in the sense that in a NE no player can improve her payoff according to BR. BR (as an individual behavior rule) and NE (as a stability criterion) are first benchmarks for our experimental analysis. However, before presenting the analysis, we will discuss and criticize these concepts as benchmarks for our repeated game in continuous time and propose competing hypotheses.
6
NE of the base game G and BR, regarded as normative concepts, implicitly presuppose the belief that other players will not react to one's own strategy change, i.e. they will keep their links and action. However, there are constellations in which a profitable action change from D to H crucially depends on the activated links of others whose, net payoff from these links becomes negative. We consider this scenario rather unlikely, however, since players may delete those links immediately. Such an action change, however, is consistent with BR. On the other hand, in a NE no player can improve her payoff according to BR. However, in our game NE exist in which a single player's action change from H to D is profitable if the other players appropriately adapt their links (i.e. activate profitable links). For example, at k = 50, activating links between H and D is only profitable for H. An H who switches to D may anticipate that the other H will afterwards activate links to her. These link reactions make the deviation profitable.
We further exemplify this argument in Figure 1 , again for k = 50. The first graph shows a network in which all single links with a positive net payoff are built. An arrow pointing from an H to a D indicates that H pays for the link. The players' payoffs are given next to their action choice. In the second graph, the northeastern D of graph 1 has unilaterally deviated to H, thereby increasing her payoff from 210 to 230. Thus, the first graph is not a NE. However, in the new network (graph 2) several links with a negative net payoff exist (indicated by dashed arrows). The deviating player may expect that those links will be deleted, as shown in graph 3. Her best response to this situation is to activate links to the D herself (graph 4), resulting in a payoff of 90, which is below her primary payoff of 210. Hence, if the player's beliefs in graph 1 include the expectation of link deletion, she compares 210 with 90 and she has no incentive to deviate to H.
Therefore, if one assumes that players will delete links with negative net payoffs quickly, static NE do not seem to be an appropriate concept for this game.
Recapitulating, the combination of BR and NE as behavior rule and stability concept presupposes that a player will delete links with negative net payoffs but does not expect other players to do so. Similarly, BR and NE do not capture a player's assumption that an opponent will activate profitable links, especially if the net payoff of these links is negative for the player herself. Are there NE generated by forward-looking thinking that are robust with respect to these expectations? It turns out that almost every NE in our game is vulnerable to deviations by players who expect certain link adaptations by others after an action change.
7 This criticism motivates us to consider a special type of forward-looking behavior where decisions are based on beliefs that account for the described credible individual threads and promises of link adaptation.
We want to emphasize that changing a link or an action has different implications:
a link change solely affects the bilateral interaction with one other player, whereas an action change affects all interactions with other players and therefore alters the strategic situation in the group. We assume that players largely classify links according to the action type that has to pay for them. Accordingly, a link adjustment in response to an action change made by another player is more straightforward than an action adjustment, which would in turn induce further reactions. Thus, assuming myopic players who only think one step ahead, we expect that a player who observes a strategy change of another player will be more likely to delete or activate a link than to change her action, and will therefore expect other players to behave in the same way.
In the following, this type of forward-looking behavior is formalized as an alternative behavioral rule. Essentially, it is concerned with linking decisions as reactions particularly to action changes. The linking reactions mentioned above (deleting links with a negative net payoff and activating links with a positive net payoff) obviously do not provide a rule for all links. Therefore, we have to come up with a general rule. For this purpose, we first introduce a notation to distinguish between the properties of links.
The following definition is set up for single links but also applies to double links.
Definition 3 (Unambiguous, Ambiguous, and Unfavorable Links). A single link from player j to a player k is called
• unambiguous for player j if she extracts a positive net payoff (i.e. payoff of HD game minus link costs) and -j's net payoff is higher than or equal to k's payoff (i.e. payoff of HD game) or -if k would have a negative net payoff if she paid for the link;
• ambiguous for player j if she extracts a positive net payoff that is smaller than k's payoff and if this also applies vice versa (i.e. if k paid for the link, she would receive a positive net payoff that is smaller than j's payoff );
• unfavorable for player j if she obtains a negative net payoff by paying for the link or if the link would be unambiguous for k if she paid for it. Table 17 .
Using this definition, we employ the following behavioral hypothesis concerning strategy changes (particularly in action choice) and expected linking responses.
Definition 4 (Anticipatory Better-Reply Rule (ABR)). A player who deviates from her current strategy s i = (σ i , g i ) changes to a strategy which increases her payoff provided that, relating to the resulting strategy configuration,
• her current neighbors will keep their unambiguous and ambiguous links and delete their double links and unfavorable links,
• other players will activate unambiguous links toward her but will not activate double links, ambiguous links, or unfavorable links.
We call this rule the anticipatory better-reply (ABR) since a player who intends to change her strategy expects her opponents to react solely by appropriately adapting their links (i.e. activating unambiguous links, keeping favorable links, and deleting unfavorable links). We refer to these expected linking reactions as ABR beliefs. A player's change in her strategy is considered to be consistent with ABR if the change increases her payoff provided that the other players adapt their links appropriately. Note that this rule is conservative with respect to missing ambiguous links by assuming that these links are built by the potentially deviating player herself. On the other hand, the rule also implies inertia on the other players by assuming that they will keep their ambiguous links.
Considering the close relationship between BR and NE, we wonder whether there is a similar stability criterion characterizing network and action configurations which corresponds to ABR. We will therefore formalize the following stability condition and call the criterion reaction-anticipating stability. The basic idea behind this criterion is similar to that behind the limited forecast equilibrium developed by Jehiel (2001) .
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Definition 5 (Reaction-Anticipating Stable (RAS)). A strategy configuration
ER(s i ) denotes the set of expected responses on player i's deviation s i according to the assumptions in ABR. Evidently, in a RAS configuration, no player has an incentive to deviate if the other players are expected to react according to ABR. For a general characterization of RAS configurations, see Table 13 . Table 15 gives an overview of all RAS configurations for the strategic-networking games utilized in our experiment.
Note that in a RAS configuration each player receives at least her minimax payoff of the stage game G and players' payoffs are within the convex hull of all feasible payoff combinations of G. Thus, every RAS configuration can also be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated strategic-networking game in continuous time.
The RAS criterion is based on the assumption that players formulate their strategies rationally but form beliefs that differ from Nash beliefs. That is, we assume that players act rationally with respect to certain beliefs that are consistent with ABR and mirror players' assumed forward-looking thinking.
10 Table 16 contrasts NE and RAS configurations with respect to the compatible numbers of H. Except for one action constellation in HD70, the constellations of the two stability criteria do not coincide and the RAS configurations always consist of more D than the NE. Graph 1 in Figure 1 is an example of a constellation with four D, which is RAS but not a NE.
In our strategic-networking game, the efficient solution (i.e. highest sum of payoffs)
is reached when all players are linked via single links (i.e. 15 links) and all players but a maximum of one choose D. 11 Since more than two H constitute a source of inefficiency, players have to behave "cooperatively" by choosing D in order to achieve an efficient outcome. In HD30 and HD50, in which it is favorable for a D to activate a link to another D, the efficient solution can be reached in RAS configurations but not as NE (Table 16 ). This result is in line with Jehiel (2001) , who shows that limited forecast, as ABR postulates, induces players to behave more cooperatively in repeated PD games than NE predicts. 12 Since in HD70 a link from D to D is not profitable, the efficient solution cannot be achieved by NE or RAS. We will keep this difference between HD30/HD50 and HD70 in mind when we analyze our experimental results.
10 For some discussion of beliefs in repeated games, see e.g. Morris (1995) , Section 5.1. 11 For every constellation of H and D, the maximum sum of payoffs is
12 Note, however, that Ule (2005) finds that cooperative behavior in finitely repeated PD played in endogenous interaction structures can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Experimental Results
In this section, we describe some characteristic observations (Section 5.1) and provide a detailed analysis with respect to the two competing hypotheses BR and ABR (Section 5.2). Throughout the statistical analysis, we use a significance level of 5 percent.
Description of Choices and Changes
In the following, we first describe the subjects' choices and changes of actions and links and then we provide some characteristics of the choices for H or D.
Note that in our experiment, we observe two phenomena which are characteristic for continuous time experiments: the subjects change their decisions very often and the results are homogeneous within each treatment.
13 The latter phenomenon may be attributed to the former, because allowing the subjects to change their strategy at any time facilitates coordination and the emergence of regularities. 13 See, for example, Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998); Berninghaus et al. (1999 . 14 Group results are given in Table 19 . actions, i.e. the ratio of link changes to action changes is roughly 5 or 6 to 1. Since a player can change only one action but five links, one could also argue that the players change every component of their strategy vector with similar frequency. We do not find significant differences between the treatments in terms of the number of link changes 17 as well as of action changes 18 . We therefore conclude that the groups in all three treatments behave similarly with respect to the frequency of link changes and action changes.
Strategy Choices and Strategy Changes

Characteristics of Choices for H and D
On average, we observe more D than H. But how long did the subjects retain their action choices? And who is more successful, H or D? Table 5 provides answers to these questions (for group results, see Table 20 ).
The second and third columns show the average time the subjects stay in the two positions. The results are clear: in all groups of all treatments, subjects on average stay longer in the D-position than in the H-position.
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The next two columns display the average payoffs of H and D. Since the subjects Why do the D earn more than the H? Why is cooperative behavior connected with higher payoffs? We will come back to these questions later in our analysis.
Analysis of Decisions and Strategy Configurations
We now turn from purely descriptive considerations to an analysis of the hypotheses BR and ABR (see Section 4). First, we examine whether the players' choices are in accord with the two behavioral hypotheses. Second, we analyze the time that the groups stay in particular configurations (e.g. NE and RAS configurations). Since our experiment is conducted in continuous time, we cannot determine when a player deliberately decides not to act. We therefore take this analysis of stability as a proxy for rational non-acting according to the (BR and ABR) beliefs.
Action Changes
In the following, we focus on the payoff effect of an action change for the subject who executes the change. More precisely, we consider the strategy changes initiated by an action change. This is carried out in three steps and is guided by the test of consistency with BR and ABR. First, we consider the direct payoff effects for the subjects who execute an action change. In the second step, we analyze whether the observed changes correspond to BR beliefs or ABR beliefs. For this purpose, we compute how the payoff explore what actually happens after an action change by analyzing the following events and the actual payoff development of the subjects who initially change their action.
Direct Payoff Effect of an Action Change. The direct payoff effect is given by the immediate payoff change of the subject who changes her action. Table 6 presents for each treatment the aggregated results of the six groups (for detailed results, see Table 21 ).
In HD30 and HD50 we observe a clear picture. Most changes from H to D lead to an immediate payoff loss, while the majority of changes from D to H cause a direct payoff increase. In HD70, the high percentage of cases in which a subject's payoff is not affected by her action change is due to the fact that the subjects are often unlinked.
Nevertheless, in all six groups of all three treatments, a change from H to D more often leads to a payoff decrease than an increase. 21 The opposite result holds for changes from D to H for HD30 and HD50: in all groups of these treatments, the change from D to H induces more payoff increases than decreases. HD70 is an exception because in four 
Action Changes Consistent with BR and ABR. While in most cases in HD30 and HD50
the subjects directly benefit from a change from D to H, they suffer a loss by changing from H to D. The latter observation contradicts BR. However, we have to take into account that a strategy change may consist not only of an action change but it may also include the subject's optimal link changes that she plans to carry out after her action change. 22 Hence, we now ask how her payoff would hypothetically be affected if she is to optimally adapt her links to her action change, while the other group members retain their current strategy (according to the BR beliefs). Note that these hypothetical examinations are based on the observed action changes. The hypothetical payoff changes are displayed in Table 7 (for group results, see Table 22 ). Now, the results for changes from D to H become clearer: in more than 90 % of the cases, a change from D to H lead to a payoff increase for the subject. 23 On the other hand, even if we assume that subjects ceteris paribus optimally adapt their links after an action change from H to D, their payoff would still decrease in most cases, particularly 22 In our experiment, each player can only change one component of her strategy vector at at time. 23 Sign test (pooled data of all treatments): in all 18 groups we observe more payoff increases than decreases, p-value < 0.05. We now take account of ABR. As before, we ask how a subject's payoff would hypothetically be affected by an action change; however, we now assume that she and the other members of her group adapt their links according to the ABR beliefs. The hypothetical payoff changes in Table 8 (group results are shown in Table 23 ) give an answer which is contrary to the respective result on BR. In particular, changes from H to D are profitable in most cases, 25 while the results for changes from D to H are ambiguous. 24 Sign test (pooled data of all treatments): two groups (one in HD30, one in HD70) with more payoff increases than decreases and 14 groups with more payoff decreases than increases, p-value < 0.05 . In two groups (one in HD30, one in HD70) we observe an equal number of payoff increases and decreases.
25 Sign test (pooled data of all treatments): 16 groups with more payoff increases than decreases and one group (HD50) with more payoff decreases than increases, p-value < 0.05. In one group of HD30 we observe an equal number of payoff increases and decreases.
26 Sign test (pooled data of all treatments): ten groups (five in HD30, one in HD50, four in HD70) with more payoff increases than decreases and six groups (one in HD30, four in HD50, one in HD70) with more payoff decreases than increases, p-value > 0.05. In two groups (one in HD50, one in HD70) we observe an equal number of payoff increases and decreases. Table   9 presents the aggregated results (group results are given in Table 24 ). After an action change, on average 80.7 % of the other players' first changes are link changes (they activate or delete a link to the considered player) and only 19.3 % of their first changes are action changes. 28 Note the difference to the argument in Section 5.1 on the relation of the numbers of link changes and action changes: now, every opponent may either change her link to the considered player or change her action (or is not counted). Thus, the high number of link changes compared to action changes reported in Table 9 can be seen as evidence in favor of our ABR hypothesis.
In HD30 and HD50, about 90 % of these observed link changes after an action change are consistent with the beliefs of ABR (see Table 9 ). The lower level of consistency with ABR in HD70 is particularly caused by two outlier groups (Groups 2 and 6). In these groups, we observe a phenomenon that we call circular sponsoring, which requires another form of link activation (see Section 5.2.2).
Result 3. The observed first decisions after an action change are consistent with the beliefs of the anticipatory better-reply rule (ABR). That is, subjects tend to adapt their links to the new action configuration as postulated by ABR.
Note that our result supports the theoretical arguments in Section 4. Since a link change, contrary to an action change, affects the bilateral interaction with only one other player,
we consider a link change in response to an action change as more likely.
Actual Payoff Development after an Action Change. We now investigate another aspect How does the sequence of link changes actually affect the payoff of the subject who initially changed her action? According to Table 10 , the majority of changes from H to D result in a payoff increase for the subject (comparison of the subject's payoff at the end of the sequence with her payoff right before her action change), although those subjects at first suffer a loss in most cases (Table 6 ). The sign test reveals that payoff with the hypothetical payoff change predicted by ABR (Table 8) . On the other hand, for subjects who change from D to H the opposite is true. That is, they may initially benefit (Table 6 ), but this gain turns into a loss over the course of the sequence. 30 As before, this result corresponds more closely to the prediction of ABR than that of BR, which predicts a payoff increase for a change from D to H (Table 7) .
Result 4. The observed payoff development of subjects who change their action is consistent with the prediction of the anticipatory better-reply rule (ABR).
According to the previous results, a player's change to H is profitable only in the short 29 Sign test(pooled data of all treatments): 15 groups with more payoff increases than decreases and three groups (one in HD30, two in HD50) with more payoff decreases than increases, p-value < 0.05.
30 Sign test (pooled data of all treatments): four groups (one in HD30, one in HD50, two in HD50) with more payoff increases than decreases and 12 groups with more payoff decreases than increases, p-value < 0.05 (one-sided test). In two groups (one in HD50, one in HD70) we observe an equal number of payoff increases and decreases.
run, while playing D pays in the long run. As a consequence, we expect subjects to keep playing D longer than H, which indeed proves to be the case (Result 1). The combination of these findings explains why D has a higher payoff than H (Result 1).
Link Changes
In the previous section we analyzed the link changes that occur directly after an action change. Now we want to know the extent to which all observed link changes are consistent with our two behavior rules, the BR and ABR. Since most cases of link changes that are consistent with BR are also consistent with ABR and vice versa, 31 for the sake of brevity we will abstain from a detailed description of this analysis. In short,
we find that the majority of link changes is consistent with BR as well as with ABR, while we observe a slightly higher level of consistency for ABR than for BR.
A closer look at the link changes that are consistent neither with BR nor with ABR reveals that the majority of these decisions fall into two specific categories. The only non-concordant cases all refer to links between H and D. Contrary to BR, ABR always requires an H to activate or to keep a link to a D, even in the case of a double link, because the D is expected to delete her link. Hence, activating a double link from H to D is consistent with ABR but not with BR, whereas deleting a double link from H to D is consistent with BR but not with ABR. In HD30, there exist two more differentiating cases: activating a single link from D to H is consistent with BR but not with ABR, whereas deleting a single link from D to H is consistent with ABR but not with BR, because in both cases ABR expects the H to activate the unambiguous link.
32 Since in HD70 a link between two D causes a loss for the D who pays it, deleting this link is consistent with BR as well as with ABR.
minute. However, this is rather risky for the player who pays first. Another strategy is directed circular sponsoring: three D are linked such that every player pays for one link. In this way, the payoff of each of the three D increases by 50 ExCU per minute. In groups 1, 2, and 6 in HD70, we observe circular sponsoring. Especially in group 6, where the concepts that we are investigating do not fit the data well, the occurrence of triadic circles in more than 30 % of the time supports sponsoring as an alternative explanation.
Observed Strategy Configurations
The previous evaluations of the experimental results support our behavioral hypothesis ABR. Now our task is to check whether the observed strategy constellations are RAS configurations or NE. Note that the observed average of about four D (see Table   5 ) is within the range of RAS constellations (see Table 15 ). Furthermore, for four D, RAS predicts higher payoffs for D than for H because the H have to pay for the links to D and the D are their only source of profits.
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We proceed by measuring the amount of time groups spend in RAS and NE. Table   11 presents aggregated treatment results (group results are given in Table 27 ).
Because each player has five links to decide on and a lot of deviations from the predicted network are possible, we additionally allow for individual link errors in our analysis. In Table 11 , the column for zero link errors displays the results when we do not allow for any deviation from the respective network. In the next columns we allow for one, two, and three link errors in the network. An error is registered whenever a link deviates from the network prescribed by the respective concept, that is, a link that 33 In RAS states all links between H and D are unambiguous. Therefore, the average payoffs of H and D in RAS constellations can be calculated by n D (a − k) for H in all treatments and by ((n D − 1)/2)(2b − k) + n H c for D in HD30 and HD50 and by n H c in HD70. Accordingly, we expect higher payoffs for H in HD30 and HD70 in case n H = 1 and higher payoffs for D in all other cases (n H = 2 in HD30 and HD70 and in all RAS in HD50). All NE in HD50 and HD70 imply higher payoffs for D but in HD30 a classification according to the number of H is not possible (depending on who pays for the links both H and D might have higher payoffs for all proportions of n H : n D ). 
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Comparing our data with respect to the two criteria, we find that for all considered numbers of link errors, RAS captures a larger part of the observed constellations than NE does. 36 The percentage of time subjects spend in RAS configurations may appear 34 As a consequence, a double link is registered as one error if the link should be there and as two errors if no link should be there. In case of a single link of a D to an H we register two errors because D has an erroneous link and H has a missing link. In other words, we are not conservative in counting link errors.
35 These numbers are calculated without considering the additional restrictions on the numbers of links of D (Table 15 ). There exist less than 89 872 RAS configurations and 197 NE in HD50 as well as 21 RAS configurations and 57 NE in HD70.
36 Sign tests (pooled data of all treatments): 0 le: 14 groups stay longer in RAS configurations than in NE and four groups (two in HD30, one in HD50 and in HD70) where it is the other way round, p-value < 0.05. 1 le: 16 stay longer in RAS configurations than in NE and two groups in HD30, where it is the other way around, p-value < 0.05.
low, but it strongly increases if we allow for link deviations.
Result 5. RAS configurations and their direct neighborhood of a few link deviations are the preferred strategy configurations.
Recall that in Section 4 we point out that RAS predicts more D than NE. Our experimental results support this hypothesis in that they provide indication for players with limited foresight and in that we observe more D than predicted by NE.
The last question we consider is whether behavior actually does stabilize in NE or RAS configurations. The last four columns of Table 11 show the dwell times, again with zero to three link errors (for group results, see Table 28 ). The dwell time of a certain configuration starts when the group reaches a NE or RAS configuration up to the respective number of link errors and stops when the number of link errors exceeds the threshold or an action change occurs. It is only counted if the exact configuration is reached within this period. These dwell times for zero link errors are higher than average dwell times (calculated as 1800 s minus the total time in RAS configurations or NE, divided by the number of networks which are not RAS or NE, respectively) which are 4.2 s, 3.6 s, and 4.6 s in the three treatments, respectively.
37 Thus, we conclude that configurations stabilize both in NE and in RAS, but not on a very high level.
Comparing NE and RAS configurations, we find longer dwell times in RAS than in NE for zero link errors but no significant difference if we allow for link errors.
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2 and 3 le: 17 groups stay longer in RAS configurations than in NE and one group in HD30 stays longer in NE, p-values < 0.05. 37 Sign test (pooled data of all treatments): RAS: 16 groups have longer than average dwell times in RAS configurations (in one in HD50 and one in HD70 it is the other way around), p-value < 0.05. NE: 13 (of 17, one did not reach any NE) groups have longer than average dwell times in NE (in one in HD30, two in HD50, and one in HD70 it is the other way around), p-value < 0.05.
38 Sign tests (pooled data of all treatments, 17 groups relevant as one group in HD30 reached no NE): 0 le: 11 groups have longer dwell times in RAS configurations than in NE, five groups (two in HD 50 and three in HD70) where it is the other way around, and one group in HD70 with equal dwell time Result 6. NE and RAS configurations are more stable than all other configurations are on average. RAS configurations are slightly more stable than NE (for zero link errors).
Conclusion
Our theoretical and experimental analyses provide new insights into the process of co-evolution of actions and networks, in particular with the HD base game.
First, the experimental data strongly support the central assumption of ABR, namely that subjects adapt to new strategy constellations by adapting links rather than by adapting actions. The underlying assumption is that the direct consequences of a link change are easier to assess than those of an action change because the former only impacts one bilateral interaction.
Furthermore, there are apparently conventions on which action type has to pay for the links. Subjects who change from H to D apparently take these conventions into account (Results 2 and 3). Strategy configurations which do not allow for profitable unilateral deviations under these conventions are observed to last a relatively long time, that is, RAS configurations are observed for a longer time than NE (Result 5). Stabilization on a low level is observed for both criteria with a slightly higher level for RAS (Result 6). However, D are tempted to deviate to H to collect a higher profit by exploiting D (Result 2). In the long run, this competitive behavior is not profitable (Table 10) , and the payoffs from playing D are higher than those from playing H (Result 1).
Thus, we may conclude that cooperative behavior pays in the long run. This is in line with the finding of Tinsley et al. (2002) that a reputation as a tough bargainer may have negative effects on payoffs. Whereas their result is due to the lower value created p-value < 0.05.
by negotiation (e.g. because information is retained), in our model the reason for the lower payoffs is that tough bargainers are avoided by others and have to bear the fixed costs to set up the negotiation.
In our model, cooperation is not self-enforcing within the population, but cooperators may nevertheless fare better than pure competitors. The credible threads, which can immediately be played out, increase the level of cooperation above the level in NE.
The theoretical criteria that we propose (ABR and RAS) take the conventions on who bears link costs into account. They capture our experimental observations better than the considered more traditional alternatives BR and NE. This could spur the development of new solution concepts for repeated strategic-networking games.
Running the experiment in continuous time is the ideal way to investigate our theoretical considerations. This approach allows players to make immediate adaptations but minimizes the risk of coordination failure due to simultaneous changes. In this environment, the assumption that the payoffs in the adjustment process are neglected may be better justified than in discrete time experiments because adaptation is fast.
A recent experimental study on PD in continuous time by Friedman and Oprea (2009) also exhibits high rates of cooperation. This further confirms our view that the continuous time setting, which allows for immediate reactions, is a crucial factor for sustaining cooperation.
Our results are based on action choices in a 2×2 HD game. A possible direction for further research is to test the robustness of our results by analyzing co-evolution with other base games or to extend the scope to related games like buyer-seller games in endogenous bipartite networks. Tables 12 and 13 show xy denotes the number of links from a x to a y, x, y ∈ {H, D}. The cases in the first column in Table 13 are described in Table 17 . (Bramoullé et al., 2004; Berninghaus and Vogt, 2006) Number of H (n H ) Link structure (single links) Table 13 : RAS configurations (the cases in the first column are described in Table 17) Case Number of H (n H ) Link structure (single links) Table 13 ). For n H = 2, the condition l DD ≤ 3 imposes no restriction. c For k = 50 and n H = 0 and n H = 1, the additional condition restricts the number of links of links of D to D to l DD ≤ 3 (see Table 13 ). For n H = 2, the condition l DD ≤ 3 imposes no restriction. B. Proof of the RAS Configurations of Table 13 According to ABR, a player will activate missing ambiguous and unambiguous links and delete unfavorable and double links. 39 Thus, in a RAS configuration, all ambiguous and unambiguous links are built and no unfavorable or double links exist. Table 17 gives an overview of the classification of links from x to y (denoted by xy) for x, y ∈ {H, D} for the seven different conditions for the cost parameter k. Case Description Unambiguous Ambiguous Unfavorable
A. NE and RAS States
The inequalities in Table 18 a + denotes a payoff increase, 0 an unchanged payoff, and − a payoff decrease. a + denotes a payoff increase, 0 an unchanged payoff, and − a payoff decrease. a + denotes a payoff increase, 0 an unchanged payoff, and − a payoff decrease. Avg. 109.8 3.9 (1.5) 76.2 % 9.9 % 13.9 % a + denotes a payoff increase, 0 an unchanged payoff, and − a payoff decrease. 
